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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Sorting Kremlin denizens: Wheat, chaff, snakes, and ticking time bombs 
The current pastime for Kremlin observers is a new parlor game, which involves 
counting the staff in the Medvedev administration and sorting Putin holdovers 
from new arrivals to determine a relative status quotient by which to measure the 
new president's relevance against that of the current prime minister.   Granted, 
the oddity of the Putin to Medvedev transition has made it more difficult than 
usual to take any Kremlin utterings at face value, but this method for discerning 
the more powerful sovereign in the present diarchical alignment is futile. 
 
The Kremlin has long been a vipers' nest of competing clans, commercial 
interests, bon vivants, and blackmailers.  The lengthy pre-succession period, 
during which the power struggle involved control over the transition (if there was 
to be one), hardened some fissures within the apparat that had emerged much 
earlier during the Putin administration.  While it is tempting to posit the start of the 
siloviki's internecine war with the publication of Cherkesov's article addressing 
the topic, there clearly had been many skirmishes in the conflict before 
Cherkesov went public.  Likewise, a simplistic formula, popularized in the 
Russian media, that repeated tales of a split between siloviki and "liberals" in 
Putin's camp made any deeper analysis of splits within camps more difficult to 
discern.  
 
The combination of a flawed analytical base with a sense of urgency to 
determine whether Putin or Medvedev truly are "in control" in Russia has created 
difficulty in distinguishing between members of the Putin and Medvedev teams in 
the Kremlin.  Many analysts seem to have forgotten that Medvedev ran the 
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Kremlin apparat for several years and developed his own network of alliances 
within what was obviously Putin's team at the time. Medvedev likely did not get to 
be Putin's successor by demonstrating his positive characteristics to the boss 
alone.  Clearly, he would have had to work the apparat to achieve the 
appropriate showcase for his talents. 
 
The fact that one or another member of Putin's team remains in the Kremlin does 
not, in and of itself, prove that Putin remains in control there; conversely, it does 
not disprove it, either.  The question simply is more complicated:  For example, 
does the fact that Aleksandr Sobyanin was tapped to become Putin's Chief of 
Staff, just as Medvedev was elevated to the position of First Deputy Prime 
Minister, make Sobyanin a member of Putin's team or Medvedev's?  Does the 
fact that he took leave from the Putin administration to run Medvedev's campaign 
alter the picture?  Or the fact that he moved to the Belyi Dom with Putin, to run 
his governmental apparatus? 
 
Medvedev developed many intricate relationships with members of Putin's 
administration and likely was involved in several competitive Kremlin clan 
disputes.  The question of where most members of the Medvedev Kremlin 
administration place their loyalty may not be resolved for some time to come, 
certainly not before Medvedev settles himself into his new role and does 
whatever tailoring he is able to his new presidential suit. 
 
For now, the actions of various members of the Kremlin and governmental 
apparats, as well as the moves of Putin and Medvedev to expand their authority, 
provide a clearer guide to the power balance at present.  With this in mind, recent 
suggestions by Medvedev Chief of Staff Sergei Naryshkin are informative.  
Naryshkin proposed expanding governmental authority by reducing the number 
of groups that have the right to legislative initiative.  According to Naryshkin, 
"when other (not government) entities come forth with legislative proposals, they 
most often express local electoral preferences, and sometimes even private 
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corporate interests, the interests of maintaining an image."  Whereas, the 
government "has at its disposal the greatest resources to put into effect the right 
of legislative initiative with a high practical return."  (1) 
 
Naryshkin's proposal marks what might be the first salvo in a struggle to 
redistribute constitutional authority between executive and legislature; his silence 
on the issue of presidential authority in the realm of legislative initiative suggests 
an argument for increasing governmental authority at the expense of the 
president, as well.  Medvedev would do well to take note of his Chief of Staff's 
inclinations on this topic and perhaps do more to ensure that the head of his 
Kremlin apparat really is a team player…a Medvedev team player. 
 
There also seems to have been a significant debate over control of the arms 
sales sector.  During Putin's presidency, Sergei Chemezov, a close associate of 
now Prime Minister Putin, managed to consolidate a quite substantial position of 
supervision over much of the armaments industry.  Last year, Chemezov moved 
beyond simply heading up the primary arms sales company, Rosoboronexport,  
to create a larger entity, Rossiiskiye Tekhnologii (Rostekhnologii), which would 
include Rosoboronexport, key metallurgical industries, helicopter, automotive, 
and other defense and defense-related industries.  Chemezov's plan for the new 
company reportedly was for it to "lead the whole [defense industry] process, 
control the production and supply chain from research and development to the 
supply of special equipment abroad." (2) Rostekhnologii originated as a state 
corporation, its creation signed into law by then President Putin, but Chemezov's 
plan also envisaged a transition to private enterprise in the form of a joint stock 
company. (3) 
 
Late last year, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov questioned Chemezov's 
plan for consolidation of defense industry assets, and for the privatization of part 
of those assets.  Ivanov, who headed the Government's Military and Industrial 
Commission, and his First Deputy at the Commission, Vladislav Putilin, 
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suggested an alternative plan for phasing in the consolidation of state controlled 
assets, as well as for their more gradual transfer to Rostekhnologii. (4) 
 
Perhaps Sergei Ivanov's recent demotion from First Deputy Prime Minister to 
Deputy Prime Minister emboldened Chemezov, but recent articles touted his 
plans for "a massive takeover" of "countless enterprises" across Russia, to be 
approved quickly by both president and prime minister.  (5)  Apparently, First 
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov was informed by Presidential Chief of Staff 
Sergei Naryshkin that such a decree would receive presidential approval.  The 
draft decree, produced by Shuvalov's office, was sent to Naryshkin, whose office 
forwarded the draft to Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Sobyanin; it was assumed 
that the decree had "secured presidential administration support." (6 –Emphasis 
added) 
 
Apparently, several government ministries and departments, as well as other 
members of the Kremlin administration, had not approved the draft decree, and 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov also repeated his earlier concerns.  Within 
days, a deal was announced that provided for President Medvedev and Prime 
Minister Putin to divide oversight of the arms industry between their offices:  
According to a June 11 decree, President Medvedev is now Chairman of the 
Government's Military Technology Cooperation Commission, and Prime Minister 
Putin is his Deputy at the Commission; Sergei Chemezov will retain his seat as a 
member of the commission.  (7)  The decree on Rostekhnologii's consolidation of 
assets may yet receive governmental and presidential approval.  However, it will 
need to traverse the entirety of the approval process—a daunting task in a 
diarchy. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1)  "Naryshkin proposes augmenting government role in law initiatives," by Boris 
Vishnevsky, Novaya gazeta, 10 Jun 08; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection (WNC). 
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(2) "Rostekhnologii: defense industry supercorporation," RIA-Novosti, 12 Apr 07 
via http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071204/90845337.html. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Chemezov unwilling to share stocks with Government, Kommersant, 4 Mar 08 
via www.kommersant.com.   
(5) "Russian Technologies Chief Sergei Chemezov plans a massive takeover," 
Kommersant, 6 Jun 08; The Russian Business Monitor, 9 Jun 08 via Lexis-Nexis 
Academic. 
(6) Ibid.  
(7) "President and Prime Minister divide arms market between them," 
Kommersant, No. 100, 16 Jun 08; What the Papers Say, 16 Jun 08 via Lexis-
Nexis Academic. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Russia goes “green” 
Around the world, June 5 is known as the official “Day of the Ecologist,” (1) but 
until this year the holiday passed without notice in most parts of Russia.  This is 
not particularly surprising as, across the country, constant reports of the 
worsening environmental situation in Russia (everything from constantly burning 
methane fires at trash dumps to undrinkable tap water, outdated, inefficient 
factories, polluted air and cities blanketed with industrial dust) paint a picture of 
encroaching environmental ruin. (2) 
 
Russia’s two largest cities rank among the world’s dirtiest. (3) In a move that will 
surely exacerbate this situation, the mayor of Moscow announced plans last 
month to remedy the waste situation by installing six additional waste incinerators 
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in the city. (4) Similarly, St. Petersburg’s region recently placed 85th out of the 
country’s 89 regions in a survey conducted by the Russian Independent 
Environmental Monitoring Agency.  The survey measures several factors, 
including air and water pollution, the treatment of industrial waste, shifting 
ecosystems, personal and business accountability, and efforts to protect the 
environment.  Further, city leaders have been accused of implementing 
environmentally dangerous industrial construction and attempting, like Moscow, 
to solve the problem of waste with garbage incinerators. Perhaps most 
alarmingly, thanks to years of dumping sewage and industrial waste in the Neva 
River, St. Petersburg’s tap water is undrinkable. In 2007, dumping reached a 
record high, with 40 percent of the city’s industrial waste going into the river, and, 
eventually, into the Gulf of Finland. (5) 
 
Of course, some areas of the country, most notably Siberia and the Far East, 
remain pristine, but this is a testament to their lack of habitability, not to human 
initiative. (6)  Also, even though Putin signed the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, the 
gesture proved to be largely symbolic, as Russia remains hesitant to embrace 
Kyoto’s mandate for lowered greenhouse gas emissions and a focus on efficient 
energy usage.  This reluctance falls in line with a pattern of institutional 
disregard, post-Soviet industrial excess, and mismanagement of waste disposal 
that perseveres to this day. 
             
This may be about to change, however, due to recent events, which suggest that 
environmental issues suddenly have become a priority of the government. Last 
week, President Dmitri Medvedev pledged to limit greenhouse gas emissions 
and use state funds to facilitate the development of clean energy sources. (7)  
This is a major victory for environmentalists, who are quick to remind officials that 
as a result of its rapid-growth economy and a legacy of Soviet environmental 
disregard, Russia is currently the world’s third largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases behind the United States and China. (8) 
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This is not the first attempt by the Russian government to improve the country’s 
ecology. However, unlike previous endeavors, the issue has been at the forefront 
of national policy since Medvedev was sworn in as president last month.  Further 
evidence of this shift came straight from the president during his opening 
remarks to those assembled at the June 3 Meeting on Improving Environmental 
and Energy Efficiency in the Russian Economy.  In the speech, Medvedev tied 
environmental reform to the country’s international competitiveness, saying that 
reports which indicate that 40 million Russians live in substandard, even 
dangerously polluted conditions indicate a lack of “environmental and resource-
saving technologies, and therefore outdated technologies are still in place, which 
is a sign of backwardness and waste.” (9) 
 
This new willingness to acquiesce to Kyoto standards also may be the result of 
recent United Nations-sanctioned alterations to Russia’s emissions ceiling, which 
was raised by 535 million tons of “assigned amount units” (AAUs), from 107 
million to 3.32 billion, and is roughly equivalent to the emissions allowed in 
France. (10)  Under Kyoto guidelines, Russia now is free to either emit more 
greenhouse gasses or sell licenses for any remaining emissions. The change is 
the result of a 2007 review, which showed that the previous limits had been 
based on Soviet-era data. (11) 
 
The issue of selling surplus AAUs illustrates a longtime complaint of Kyoto 
detractors, that the measurement standards of the AAU allowance system are 
fundamentally unfair because they fail to take a country’s efforts to improve the 
environment into account.  In Russia’s case, what appears to be an impressive 
environmental turnaround in gas emissions is actually the result of two decades 
of decline in Soviet-era heavy industrial infrastructure, not due to any effort made 
by the country to become more environmentally conscious. (12) 
 
At the same time, Kyoto supporters view any positive news about Russian 
participation as a victory.  Despite the fact that currently Russia is not obliged to 
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lower its emissions, there had been concerns that the stricter standards expected 
in the next iteration of the treaty would be enough to cause Russia’s refusal to 
renew its participation.  This would be a serious blow to the 181-country treaty. 
(13)  When Putin agreed to participate in 2004, there were only 37 countries 
involved, and none of them were major producers of greenhouse gasses. The 
treaty was able to go into effect only after organizers secured Russia’s support. 
(14)  Under the current treaty, which lasts until 2012, participating nations agreed 
to cut emissions by 5 percent of its 1990 levels. Even with Russia’s current 
refusal to acquiesce to Kyoto standards, the country’s 2006 emissions were 34 
percent below 1990 levels (15). 
 
In another major environmental step forward, Medvedev called for a “fully-fledged 
system of standards for allowable impact on the environment” to be introduced 
into the State Duma this October, as well as improvements to water, air, and soil 
standards relative to each region’s current ecological conditions. In order to 
reach these goals, the president has pledged state funding for “green” projects 
for the next three years. (16) 
 
Officials were quick to internalize the government’s new position.  In a recent 
press conference at the annual “Russia and the Kyoto protocol” summit, 
Federation Council Speaker and Chairman of the modern socialist party Russia 
of Justice Sergei Mironov told reporters that “We must limit ourselves. We must 
limit any emissions that accelerate global warming or simply pollute the 
environment." (17)  With these words, Mironov became the first high-level official 
to state publicly that the government would break away from its longstanding 
refusal to accept emissions cuts, a stance Russia has held since signing the 
Kyoto Protocol.  As recently as April of this year, Russia's top Kyoto official and 
Deputy Economy Minister Vsevolod Gavrilov still maintained that Moscow would 
not be cutting emissions anytime soon due to the energy needs of the middle 
class and heavy industrial sector.  A month earlier, he had pledged to approach 
clean energy projects "from a principle of rejection." (18) 
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No matter what Gavrilov says, it appears that Mironov, who technically outranks 
Gavrilov, but has no official influence over Russia’s handling of Kyoto, has made 
it his personal mission to proclaim Russia’s shift in environmental policy and is 
attempting to position the country as a leader in the “green” movement. Speaking 
on behalf of the government, he announced that "Russia in the post-Kyoto period 
must provide for itself a fixed role in the emission of carbon … we should not be 
reckless in taking on these responsibilities." (19) 
 
Mironov’s actions, however, may be more indicative of his deeper commitment to 
the party line than global clean energy initiatives, as only one year earlier at the 
same event, he used the results from several government-funded studies in 
order to deny the existence of global warming, going as far as to postulate that 
the earth is getting colder. (20)  It was not the first time he had publicly decried 
the concept of global warming – in an interview published on Russia of Justice’s 
official web site, Mironov warns readers to “get prepared for global cooling, which 
is to start approximately in the second half of the 21st century.” (21) 
 
Mironov, luckily, has been able to keep any nagging questions about his seeming 
ideological inconsistency in check behind an active campaign to convince 
America, China and India to become more environmentally aware, arguing that 
"Some countries will be trying not to pollute while others will be doing whatever 
they want. This would not be right and it would not be fair." (22) 
 
In addition to environmental concerns voiced on the campaign trail, the latest 
round of energy conscious programs proposed by Medvedev have raised the 
hopes of Russia’s green campaigners, a growing minority, that such initiatives 
will continue throughout Medvedev’s time in office. (23) 
 
These initiatives also contribute to the growing public perception of Medvedev’s 
liberal image, which raises the question of whether this new focus on 
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environmental policy stems from a legitimate desire to clean the country or 
whether it indicates the president’s eagerness to distance himself from his 
predecessor, whose administration prolonged Russia's poor record of 
environmental policy. 
 
Medvedev has stressed the need not only to improve the environment, but also 
to fix the system that regulates it.  In his eyes, this may include reworking rules 
that had become “detached from reality,” because as everyone knows, the most 
important thing about judicial responsibilities is their unavoidability.” (24)  Even 
within the context of Medvedev’s renewed focus on environmental responsibility, 
this final statement speaks of the president’s oft-stated commitment to the rule of 
law.  It is only one of a series of recently introduced policy initiatives aimed at 
promoting an image of a clean, fair and law-abiding country, including measures 
to reform the judicial system, prison system and eradicate economic corruption.  
This may be part of a larger goal of adjusting the global perception of Russia, in 
order to make it more competitive on the global market, especially on an 
economic level. At a recent economic forum in St. Petersburg, Rex Tillerson, 
CEO of Exxon Mobil, commented that foreign investors lack “confidence in the 
rule of law in Russia today.” (25)  These reform packages have the potential to 
impact significantly Russia’s legal, economic, and environmental systems.  Even 
if the improvements never come to fruition, they are an intriguing glimpse of what 
Russian lawmakers want the country to become. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Simon Shuster, “Russia swings to openness on Kyoto, clean energy,” 
Reuters, 4 Jun 08 via 
http://in.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idINL0462496820080604. Last 
accessed 13 Jun 08. 
(2) “TV looks at environmental problems across Russia,” British Broadcasting 
Company (BBC), 8 Jun 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 11 Jun 08, 
2008-#113. 
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(3) Tiffany M. Luck, “In pictures: the world’s 25 dirtiest cities,” Forbes, 26 Feb 08 
via http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/24/pollution-baku-oil-biz-logistics-
cx_tl_0226dirtycities_slide_2.html. Last accessed 16 Jun 08. 
(4) “Medvedev calls for environmental clean up, crack down on polluters,” DPA, 3 
Jun 08 via David Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), 3 Jun 08, 2008-#108. 
(5) Galina Stolyarova, “City ranks among most polluted in Russia,” St. Petersburg 
Times, 10 Jun 08 via http://www.sptimes.ru/story/26241. Last accessed 13 Jun 
08. 
(6) Ibid,  BBC, 8 Jun 08. 
(7) Ibid, DPA, 3 Jun 08. 
(8) Alister Doyle and Gerard Wynn, “EXCLUSIVE - Russian wins new 
greenhouse gas emissions rights,” Reuters, 29 May 08 via 
http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINL2325303220080529. Last accessed 13 
Jun 08. 
(9) “Opening words at a meeting on improving environmental and energy 
efficiency in the Russian economy,” The Kremlin, 3 Jun 08 via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/03/2225_type82913_202070.shtml.  
Last accessed 13 Jun 08. 
(10) Ibid, Shuster. 
(11) Ibid, Shuster.  
(12) Ibid, Shuster. 
(13) “Kyoto Protocol,” Wikipedia, 15 Jun 08 via 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol.  Last accessed 15 Jun 08. 
(14) “Russia gives Kyoto kiss of life,” BBC, 3 Sep 02 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2233220.stm. Last accessed 15 Jun 08. 
(15) Ibid, Shuster. 
(16) Ibid, Kremlin. 
(17) Ibid, Shuster. 
(18) Ibid, Shuster.  
(19) Ibid, Shuster.  
(20) Ibid, Shuster. 
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(21) “Sergey M. Mironov - ABOUT - blitz-interview,” Russia of Justice via 
http://mironov.info/bl.  Last accessed 13 Jun 08. 
(22) Ibid, Shuster.  
(23) Ibid, Shuster. 
(24) Ibid, Kremlin. 
(25) Simon Shuster, “Russia’s weak judiciary hampers investment – Exxon 
CEO,” Reuters via 
http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSL0772943620080607.  Last 
accessed 15 Jun 08. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Politkovskaya trial soon 
Twenty months ago, Anna Politkovskaya was murdered outside her apartment in 
Moscow. Since then, the investigation into her assassination has gone through 
several stages. First, in mid-February 2007, authorities announced that two 
Chechen individuals allegedly involved in the assassination had, with the help of 
military satellite photography, been identified, tracked, and arrested. 
Approximately six months later an FSB officer, Lieutenant Colonel Pavel 
Anatolyevich Ryaguzov, was detained in connection with the case. According to 
Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika, Ryaguzov had carried out advanced 
surveillance of Politkovskaya and had passed his intelligence to Shamil Burayev, 
a political opponent of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.  
    
Further developments in the investigation included the FSB’s success in tracing 
the murder weapon to a weapons workshop in Dagestan, and in (apparently) 
linking Politkovskaya’s murder to that of Central Bank Chairman Andrei Kozlov. 
Chaika’s working theory was that both hits had been carried out at the behest of 
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a prominent Russian living abroad. It was hardly a leap to deduce that Chaika 
was referring to Boris Berezovsky. (1)  
   
Three months ago, Vyacheslav Smirnov (one of Chaika’s staff), claimed that law-
enforcement authorities finally had succeeded in identifying the trigger man and 
were mounting operations to capture him. As a result of this information, 
Ryaguzov’s request to be released on bail was denied while the completion 
deadline for the investigation was moved to 7 September 2008. (2)  
    
During the last month, there has been further movement on the investigation. On 
May 12th, two suspects—apparently the Chechen individuals identified in 
February 2007—were released from custody at the instigation of the 
Investigations Committee of the Prosecutor General’s office.  Named as Dmitri 
Grachev and Magomed Demelkhanov, they were released (with travel 
restrictions) because their role in the murder had not been direct, but “auxiliary.”  
They are to face trial, but as accessories, not primary actors. (3) Authorities 
subsequently also released Burayev into house-arrest on his own recognizance, 
because he had cooperated fully with the investigation and “agreed to appear 
before the investigator at short notice.” (4)  
    
On the same day as the suspects were released, authorities finally named the 
suspected hit-man as Rustam Makhmudov, a 34-year-old Chechen. Although he 
has not yet been found, he will be placed on a watch-list, and an arrest on sight 
warrant in his name has been issued. Prosecutors have charged him with murder 
in absentia. (5) Once all documents have been filed correctly, Makhmudov’s 
name will be placed on the most wanted list in all 186 of Interpol’s member 
countries. (6)  
    
Early this month, Vladimir Markin, the Investigations Committee’s spokesman, 
claimed that the investigation would be wrapped up by June 20th. At that point, 
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Politkovskaya’s son will be permitted to study the prosecution’s file. (7) The case 
will sent to trial in “the near future.” (8)  
    
Presumably, it is not a normal step in Russia to allow someone so personally 
involved in the case (such as Politkovskaya’s son) to study prosecution evidence 
before trial. The fact that authorities are permitting this is an important signal that 
law-enforcement officials—and likely their political masters—want the case and 
trial to be over as soon as possible, and for any verdict to be beyond reproach in 
the eyes of Politkovskaya’s family and colleagues.  Ryaguzov’s and Burayev’s 
fates therefore likely will be to carry the can. It seems safe to say that the 
important questions relating to state surveillance of Politkovskaya, the alleged 
rogue actions of Ryaguzov, and the length of time taken to identify the alleged 
assassin will never be answered. 
 
Security service reshuffle 
On May 7, Dmitri Medvedev was sworn in as Russia’s new President. Upon 
handing over the Presidency, Vladimir Putin moved to the Prime Minister’s post. 
Within days of the inauguration, a number of changes in the hierarchy of Russia’s 
security apparatus were made.  
    
The first move came on May 13, during a session of the Presidential Security 
Council, when Medvedev announced that Nikolai Patrushev – Head of the FSB 
since August 1999, would be replaced by Alexander Bortnikov, formerly head of 
that agency’s Economic Security Division. (9) Then, on May 16th, Viktor 
Cherkesov was removed as Head of the Federal Service for Control of Narcotics 
(FSKN), and replaced by Viktor Ivanov. Cherkesov is now to head up 
Rosoboronpostavka (the Federal Agency for Supplies of Armaments, Military and 
Special Hardware, and Materiel), the department dedicated to arms sales and 
deliveries. (10) Finally, Vladimir Ustinov was removed from his post at the Justice 
Ministry and sent to the Caucasus as the President’s Plenipotentiary 
Representative in the Southern Federal District. (11)  
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Various Russian commentators and media outlets have posited different reasons 
for this reshuffle. First, it has been argued that Bortnikov’s loyalties lie with 
Medvedev rather than Putin. Andrei Soldatov—a long-time observer of the 
security services—has suggested that plans to “divide control over the law 
enforcement agencies” have been “shelved,” and that Prime Minister Putin is not, 
in fact, attempting to seize control of the law-enforcement agencies. Control will 
be retained by Medvedev in the Kremlin. (12) Sergei Goncharov, a former 
KGB/FSB officer, takes the middle ground and argues that Bortnikov is a figure 
who “suits everyone including Medvedev, Putin,” and that his promotion signals 
little more than a refocusing of the FSB onto economic crimes and corruption 
issues. (13)  
    
An extension of this second argument, which touches on Cherkesov in particular, 
posits that the goal of the reshuffle in toto, is to end the war of the siloviki. 
According to this analysis, Patrushev and Cherkesov were viewed as the main 
“antagonists” in the “fight for influence and control.” (14) Their battle came to a 
head with the arrest earlier this year of several of Cherkesov’s deputies at FSKN 
and his subsequent open letter to Kommersant regarding the siloviki war. (15) 
Effectively, the reshuffle was carried out to remove those siloviki who “make all 
sorts of policy statements in public,” and to make the power system “more 
businesslike.” (16) 
    
While both of these arguments may be correct, there is a plausible third 
argument for the reshuffle, namely to ensure that Putin, in fact—if not in name—
retains control.  Both Bortnikov and Patrushev are linked to Igor Sechin, Deputy 
Chief of Staff during Putin’s Presidency, and now Deputy Prime Minister. 
Cherkesov, who allegedly harbored his own ambitions for the FSB, has been 
removed from the security apparatus. (17)  
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Patrushev meanwhile, has been appointed to head the Security Council. 
Although in the past that organization has seen its power fluctuate, a decree 
signed by Medvedev on May 25 has instituted changes. The Security Council 
now includes the speakers of both Duma houses—Boris Gryzlov (formerly 
Interior Minister) and Sergei Mironov, both of whom are staunch Putin loyalists, 
as well as the heads of all the intelligence and law-enforcement agencies 
excepting the GRU. Patrushev has been appointed to lead the Security Council, 
which is to be given increased powers.  (18) 
    
Barely a month has passed since this reshuffle was formalized. As such, it is too 
early to judge exactly how the Security Services—or the Security Council—will 
function in the new administration. What can be said with a high degree of 
probability, however, is that Medvedev did not conduct the FSB/Security Council 
restructuring without consulting Putin. It is safe to say that Gryzlov and Mironov 
were included to represent Putin in his role as Head of Government. Patrushev, 
as some analysts have suggested, probably was moved to his new position in 
order to act as Putin’s enforcer. (19)  
    
Handing over control of the Security Services to Medvedev would constitute a 
mistake on Putin’s part: in so doing, the latter would potentially jeopardize his 
own position and safety. It is therefore highly unlikely that the President’s office 
will have any real influence over security matters. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Man Who Ordered Politkovskaya Murder is Outside Russia, Says Chief 
Prosecutor,” Channel One Worldwide (for Europe), Moscow, in Russian, 27 Aug 
07; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(2) “Police Seek Killer of Journalist,” The Moscow Times, 31 Mar 08 via Lexis-
Nexis.  
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(3) “Russian Prosecutors to Check Why Politkovskaya Murder Suspects Set 
Free,” RIA Novosti News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 12 May 08 via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(4) “One More Suspect Released in Russian Journalist Murder Case,” Interfax, 3 
Jun 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(5) “Suspected Killer of Russian Journalist Put on International Wanted List,” 
ITAR-TASS News Agency, Moscow, in English, 12 May 08 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Court Leaves Ibragim Makhmudov Charged in Politkovskaya Case in 
Custody,” ITAR-TASS, 26 May 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
(7) “Investigation Into Politkovskaya Murder Case May Be Over Soon,” ITAR-
TASS, 3 Jun 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
(8) “Russian Journalist Murder Case To Be Sent To Court Soon-Prosecutor,” 
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
Russia ups military presence in Central Asia 
In recent months, Russia has boosted its military presence noticeably in 
resource-rich Central Asia, sending a message that Moscow still regards these 
former Soviet republics as home turf. In early June, the Kremlin announced plans 
to reinforce Russia’s airbase in the Kyrgyz Republic. (1)  This comes after 
announcements in May of plans to strengthen the Russian naval presence in 
(land-locked) Kyrgyzstan, and to bolster military cooperation with Tajikistan and 
Kazakhstan.  The Kremlin has made a point of couching Russia’s increased 
Central Asia profile in terms of its commitments under the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO), which helps legitimize its plans and reassures its 
Central Asian allies that Russia takes their security seriously.  
 
On 4 June, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force, Colonel-General 
Aleksandr Zelin, announced Russia’s intent to send one AN-26 transport aircraft 
and three additional SU-27 fighters from the Krasnodar aviation school in 
Southern Russia to the Russian air base near the Kyrgyz town of Kant. (2)  About 
500 servicemen, and Russian SU-25 and SU-27 fighters, AN-24 and IL-76 
transport aircraft and MI-8 helicopters have been deployed to Kant since it was 
set up in 2003.  According to Zelin, the additional aircraft will be used to intensify 
the training of Kyrgyz pilots. (3) 
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In addition to reinforcements at Kant, Russia has taken steps to strengthen 
Russian-Kyrgyz naval ties.  Russia currently has two naval facilities in 
Kyrgyzstan, including a naval research facility used to test advanced torpedo and 
propulsion guidance systems.  In May, Russian Naval Commander-in-Chief, 
Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, met with the Chief of the Kyrgyz General Staff, Major 
General Boris Yugai, to discuss the expansion of military-technical cooperation 
and strengthening of regional security. (4)   On 30 May, Vysotskiy announced 
that the two countries have reached an agreement to allow continued operation 
of two Russian naval facilities, which have been in operation since Soviet times. 
(5)  Vysotskiy also noted that the Russian Navy has placed a four million dollar 
order with Dastan, a Kyrgyz defense company, for torpedoes, equipment and 
parts related to underwater weapons, and he hinted that these orders might 
increase in the future. (6)  Both Russian and Kyrgyz officials stressed the 
importance of a continued Russian naval presence in Kyrgyzstan.  The 
agreements, which originally were negotiated in 1997, allow the Russian military 
to use Kyrgyz territory for the next 15 years. (7) 
 
Russia also is stepping up its military presence in Tajikistan.  On 7 June, Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev met with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon to discuss 
“further expansion of military-technical cooperation” between Russia and 
Tajikistan. (8)  Both leaders stressed the importance of Russia’s military 
presence in Tajikistan and pointed to the importance of intensifying cooperation 
between the two nations in order to fight extremism, terrorism and illegal drug 
trafficking. (9)  Plans are underway to increase combat power and to modernize 
the weaponry and military hardware of the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division 
(MRD) housed at a Russian base near Dushanbe. (10)  The Tajik government 
considers Russia one of its most reliable allies and says that improved Russian 
military capability within its borders is in Tajikistan’s national interest. (11) 
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Russia is reaching out to Kazakhstan, as well, by emphasizing the two states’ 
strong military ties.  As newly elected Russian president, Medvedev’s first trip 
abroad was to Kazakhstan, where he reportedly “paid special attention to the 
further development of ties in the field of military technological cooperation” 
during the visit. (12)  Kazakhstan is working to modernize its armed forces and is 
looking to Russia as a source of hardware to upgrade its air defense system. (13)  
Kazakh Defense Minister Danial Akhmetov referred to Russia as Kazakhstan’s 
chief strategic ally and claimed that Kazakhstan “has bought, buys and will buy 
all its principal armaments, primarily for those of its air defenses, air force and 
navy, from Russia.” (14) 
 
For the first time in nearly a decade, Russia will conduct two large-scale 
exercises with Kazakhstan.  The first of these—Interaction 2008—is a joint 
command post exercise, which began on 9 June.  The primary purpose of the 
exercise, which is being conducted in the Eastern Kazakhstan Region, is to test 
the readiness and ability of command elements of Kazakhstan’s Eastern 
Regional Command and to improve interaction between the command and 
control elements of the Russian and Kazakh armed forces.  A similar exercise is 
planned for September in the Chelyabinsk region of Russia. (15) 
 
None of these moves amounts to a significant build up of forces and none will 
result in any meaningful increase in combat capability in Central Asia.   They do, 
however, signal Russia’s firm resolve to remain the dominant influence in the 
region, which, together with the Caspian Sea, is said to hold the world’s third-
largest reserves of oil and natural gas. (16)   This “boost” in Russian military 
presence is intended to send a clear message that Moscow continues to see the 
former Soviet Republics of Central Asia as home turf.  
 
Russia’s warnings to stay out of Central Asia are not aimed solely at the West.  
Medvedev landed in Kazakhstan in May on his way to China, another Cold War 
rival turned “strategic partner.”   Though Moscow and Beijing are allied in trying 
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to keep the West out of Central Asia, they have been jockeying with each other 
for influence there, as well.  Moscow increasingly is worried about China’s 
expansion in Central Asia and is concerned over China’s failure to recognize 
Central Asia as falling within Russia’s special sphere of influence.  
 
China already has made significant inroads in the region, having reached a 
pipeline deal with Kazakhstan, as well as negotiating a gas pipeline agreement 
with Turkmenistan. (17)   China provides its own military-technical assistance in 
the region and is actively pursuing increased military cooperation with Tajikistan. 
(18)  China has provided 15 million dollars in military aid since Tajik 
independence and trains Tajik military cadets in Chinese military colleges, free of 
charge. (19) 
 
Despite China’s successes and the recent willingness of Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to negotiate with the West regarding oil, natural 
gas, and military presence, Russia is still the dominant power in Central Asia.  
Moscow’s latest moves are calculated to highlight to its Central Asian allies the 
benefits of continued Russian influence, while  reiterating to the world its resolve 
to preserve its clout in this strategic region.  The latest “Great Game” in Central 
Asia is one Russia appears to be winning so far, and the Kremlin is doing what it 
can to keep it that way. 
 
Source Notes:  
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(2) Ibid. 
(3) “Russian Air Force Launches Active Training of Young Pilots at Kant-
Commander,” CIS General Newswire, 4 Jun 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creela Henderson 
 
Titanic shenanigans: TNK-BP corporate war 
For those who regard the election of Dmitri Medvedev as a victory for rule of law 
and liberalized markets in Russia, this year’s Saint Petersburg Economic Forum 
apparently provided occasion to toast the dawn of a new era. (1) Absent from 
Russia's most important annual business conference were Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin and the siloviki masterminds of the state’s takeover of vast 
swathes of the national economy, leaving the podium to more liberal-minded 
politicians who pledged to respect property rights and to reduce state 
interference in the economy. Foreign corporate executives and investors 
reportedly were delighted by what they perceived as “Medvedev's keen 
knowledge of the challenges and opportunities” facing investors in Russia, (2) an 
impression confirmed by recent government decisions to bring the privatization of 
the national electricity sector to culmination and to repeal a law allowing the state 
to seize the assets of companies convicted of tax evasion, a major legal tool 
used by tax authorities in nationalization cases. (3) 
 
The scrum over Russia’s energy assets continued unabated on the sidelines of 
the conference, however, where British Petroleum chief executive Tony Hayward 
was hounded by reporters eager to get the scoop on rumors that a major state-
controlled energy company was behind the official harassment of TNK-BP, a 50-
50 joint oil venture between BP and four Russian tycoons that was established 
with the blessing of then-President Putin in 2003. In recent months, Russian 
authorities have raided the Moscow offices of BP, arrested a BP employee on 
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charges of industrial espionage, launched a back-tax claim against the company, 
and blocked its foreign employees from working in Russia. (4) Though little is 
known, much is suspected about the designs of authorities who, analysts note, 
could not launch such a concerted campaign without the tacit approval of the 
Kremlin. Evidently, authorities are attempting to tighten the state’s hold over the 
energy sector further by forcing the sale of a controlling stake in the venture, 
thereby pumping a quarter of BP’s worldwide oil output to a Russian state firm. 
(5) But which firm stands to gain the prize? To answer that question would be to 
identify a key power broker inside Medvedev’s new administration. 
 
Gazprom is a likely frontrunner for a stake in the venture. When Medvedev was 
sworn in as Russian president on May 7, the monopoly where he served as 
Chairman of the board of directors since 2000 seemed poised to enjoy the new 
administration’s exclusive support in its drive to become a global energy player. 
Thus, when 78 FSB officers raided BP’s Russian headquarters in March, 
following the British company’s refusal to yield a controlling stake in TNK-BP, 
Medvedev’s denial that authorities had acted with ulterior motives met with 
general skepticism. (6) While Gazprom clearly is interested in seizing a 
controlling stake in the multinational venture, and few doubt the energy giant’s 
willingness and capacity to resort to political tactics, it is odd that the company 
would choose to step up pressure on TNK-BP in March, two months ahead of 
Medvedev’s inauguration, at which time the full support of the Kremlin would be 
thrown behind Gazprom’s bid. It is possible that from the helm of Gazprom 
Medvedev simply was not privy to the motives behind the raid because it was an 
outside job, aimed as much at Gazprom as at TNK-BP. 
 
Two details in the story of the raid point to this conclusion: the role of the FSB, 
and statements by witnesses who reported that agents were only interested in 
seizing documents related to Gazprom. While office files were being scrutinized 
at TNK-BP headquarters, BP employees interrogated by FSB agents were left 
with the impression that “the only thing that seemed to interest the officers, based 
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on their questions, was information on Gazprom.” (7) Witnesses’ statements 
gave rise to suspicions that the author of the raid was not Gazprom, but Rosneft, 
a rival state energy major vying for a stake in the multinational venture. 
According to this scenario, Rosneft’s chairman, Igor Sechin, anticipating 
Gazprom’s advantage and his own demotion following Medvedev’s May 
inauguration, engaged his FSB allies in an act of industrial espionage in an effort 
to determine how far Gazprom had progressed in its takeover bid at TNK-BP. (8) 
Such a move would not be uncharacteristic for Sechin, who built Rosneft from 
the spoils of Yukos assets after orchestrating the private oil company’s downfall 
in 2003. Sechin is popularly portrayed as the hardline nemesis of the liberal 
Medvedev, a rivalry that is carried over into the national energy industry through 
the agency of dueling state energy majors Rosneft and Gazprom. In the case of 
TNK-BP, Sechin’s challenge to Gazprom reflects a deeper struggle by the siloviki 
to retain control over strategic assets during the early days of the Medvedev 
presidency. 
 
Regardless of which state energy firm gains the upper hand, the fact remains 
that neither the Russian partners nor the British parent company is eager to give 
up a controlling stake in the highly lucrative joint venture. On 16 June, following 
months of corporate infighting between the Russian and foreign shareholders of 
TNK-BP, the Russian partners announced that they are ready to dispose of their 
50 percent stake, in return for a commensurate portion of BP’s holdings. (9) BP 
rejected the proposal and now the battle is expected to rage on in Russian 
courts. There, the ringing rhetoric of the economic forum will be put to the test to 
determine whether Medvedev has sufficient conviction and authority to follow 
through with his pledges to reduce government interference in the national 
economy and to reinstate the rule of law in Russia. 
 
Source Notes:  
(1) Stott, Michael; Zhdannikov, Dmitry; Dobbie, Andrew, ed.; “Russia tries to allay 
foreign investors' worries,” Reuters, 8 Jun 08 via 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Key election development: Party organizations maturing 
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The Georgian parliamentary elections resulted in few surprises, but produced at 
least one positive note. In the final results released by the Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC), the National Movement Party collected 119 of the 150 
available seats. While undoubtedly there were electoral irregularities and a not 
completely unbiased electoral environment – Mátyás Eörsi, head of PACE’s 
observation mission, characterized the election as failing to “make full use of the 
democratic potential of Georgia,” (1) the results are still interesting because of 
what they reveal about party development. 
 
In the competition for Georgia’s 150 parliamentary seats, 75 MPs were elected in 
single-mandate districts, while the remaining 75 were elected via proportional 
party lists. This election was the first conducted under new legislation, which 
stipulated that the candidate in a single-mandate district who earns the most 
votes and gathers more than 30% of the total vote, wins the election. 
 
It is a maxim of Georgian politics—and, indeed, much of the post-Soviet space—
that politics is dominated by personalities. This leadership-centric model 
generally has a negative effect on political party development, since parties rely 
on the charisma of their leaders, rather than on institutional strength to gain 
political power. While the current Georgian context, from the presidency on 
down, offers many examples in support of this axiom, a closer look at the recent 
election may indicate that Georgia’s political parties are developing a broader 
base with more capacity to field candidates beyond Tbilisi or their regions of 
traditional support. 
 
The election highlights the fact that while, as expected, the National Movement 
has a nation-wide party organization, several other parties also managed to field 
a very competitive number of candidates. In terms of party reach, parties fielding 
candidates in the “majoritarian” (in fact, plurality) or single-mandate elections can 
be divided into three tiers, based on the extent of their field of candidates. (2) The 
first group, which consists of the ruling National Movement Party, the Nine-Party 
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Opposition Bloc, the Labor Party, and the Republican Party, managed to produce 
candidates in at least 65 of the country’s 75 voting districts. The second tier, 
encompassing the Christian-Democratic Alliance/Greens, the Christian-
Democratic Party, the Traditionalist-Our Georgia-Party-of-Women group, and the 
Rightist Alliance-Industrialists, consists of those parties supporting candidates in 
between 25 and 45 of Georgia’s 75 districts. The final tier, taking in the Our 
Country party, the Georgian Politics group, and the Georgian National Party of 
Radical Democrats, sponsored candidates in 15 or fewer of the district elections. 
More telling is that in Tbilisi (in a country whose politics absolutely revolve around 
the capital), of the second and third tier parties, only the Christian-Democratic 
Alliance managed to field more than four candidates in the 10-voting district 
capital. (3) 
 
In the “majoritarian” voting contests, the National Movement captured 71 of the 
75 seats, with the Nine-Party Opposition and the Republican Party dividing the 
remaining four seats at two apiece.  These two seats won by the Republican 
Party were in the Tsageri and Kazbegi regions. In Tsageri, the Republican win 
largely was due to the withdrawal from the race of Valery Giorgobiani, the 
National Movement candidate, after the Nine-Party Opposition made public an 
audio tape in which a man, who the opposition claimed was Giorgobiani, 
threatened government employees with loss of their jobs if they failed to deliver a 
vote of 80% for the National Movement in their district. (4) Absent a National 
Movement candidate, the Republican Party’s Karlo Kopaliani trounced his 
competition, pulling in a sound 64.68%, although the National Movement still 
managed to pull in 56.28% of the proportional vote. 
 
The Nine-Party Opposition single-mandate victories were, not surprisingly, in the 
Tbilisi strongholds of Vake and Didube, although the tight competition for the 
Gidani district seat deserves honorable mention. (5) The proportional vote 
competition between the National Movement and the Nine-Party Opposition was 
closest in Tbilisi, particularly in Saburtelo (37.94% to 35.8%, respectively), in 
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Didube, where the two groups were within 0.13% of each other (36.9% to 
36.77%), and in Vake, where the Nine-Party Opposition took a decided lead with 
42.43% of the vote to the ruling party’s 33.77%. 
 
However, in Georgia as a whole, the proportional vote tilted strongly towards the 
National Movement. A survey conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner 
Research from May 8-12 in Georgia estimated that the National Movement likely 
would be supported by 51% of those actually voting in the polls, with the 
Christian-Democratic Party likely to receive 11%, the Nine-Party Opposition 10%, 
the Labor Party 5%, and the Republican Party 3%. (6) A further 19% were 
reckoned to be undecided. 
 
In the final CEC results of the proportional party list voting, only four parties 
cleared the 5% threshold required to enter parliament – the National Movement 
Party (59.18%), the Nine-Party Opposition Bloc (17.73%), the Christian-
Democratic Party (8.66%), and the Labor Party (7.44%). (7) 
 
The new parliament convened on June 7, three days earlier than expected, in 
order to circumvent the opposition’s decision to stage a boycott of the newly 
elected body. Many, but not all, of the Labor Party candidates and the Nine-Party 
Opposition’s 17 winning contenders have called for new elections and declared 
their intention to renounce their parliamentary seats. Some opposition politicians 
even have called for the establishment of an alternative parliament, though in the 
past that particular idea has failed markedly in Georgia. 
 
The Christian-Democratic Party, on the other hand, has taken its place in 
parliament after negotiations with the National Movement. Reportedly, the 
National Movement agreed that one non-parliamentary majority lawmaker could 
sit on the Supreme Council of Justice, the highest body for the judicial system, 
and also that an opposition member would be appointed to the National 
Regulatory Commission for Communications. Additionally, the ruling party 
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agreed that the parliamentary opposition must be consulted regarding 
constitutional amendments, although whether it must actually take into account 
opinions received during these consultations was never mentioned. (8) These 
concessions are relatively slight compared to what the ruling party reportedly was 
prepared to offer the opposition – the appointment of three deputy speakers and 
the appointment of deputy chairpersons to legislative committees. (9) It may be 
that the parliament is holding on to a few carrots in case the Nine-Party 
Opposition ever decides to move off the parliament steps and into its seats. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Shunned by foreign investors, Tajikistan faces long, cold, hungry winter 
ahead 
In hopes of avoiding a new round of nationwide electricity black-outs next winter, 
Tajikistan’s President Rahmon has been on a mission to attract a massive 
infusion of foreign investment to boost his country’s energy infrastructure, 
particularly in the hydropower industry.  Unfortunately, thus far his efforts have 
produced few results, leaving his administration to face not only the prospect of 
future energy shortages, but of rapidly rising prices for basic goods and services, 
as well as what the UN is portraying as a global food crisis.  Tajikistan is a net 
importer of food and between the unusually cold winter, lack of spring rain and a 
locust infestation, the country already has lost 30% of its wheat harvest, 35% of 
its potato crop, and 20% of other vegetable crops.  Two of Tajikistan’s biggest 
grain suppliers, Russia and Kazakhstan, have reduced their exports, (1) and the 
others undoubtedly will either follow suit or significantly raise their prices, if they 
have not done so already.  Unless the Tajik government receives an enormous 
influx of foreign investment and/or aid dollars, President Rahmon may find 
himself with a full-blown humanitarian crisis on his hands, once cold weather sets 
in. 
 
President Rahmon’s main strategy to avoid such a dire scenario seems to be 
focused on building up his country’s capacity to generate hydropower for 
domestic use, as well as for export.  To this end, he has been courting 
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representatives from various foreign governments and international companies, 
in order to procure contracts to finish the construction of the Roghun dam and 
hydropower station and build a number of new hydroelectric power stations.  
Investors’ reluctance to sign on to any of these projects is not surprising, given 
how low water levels are in the country’s lakes and rivers, not to mention that 
Tajikistan is not known for its hospitable investment environment.  Graeme 
Loten, the British ambassador to Tajikistan, was quite candid in his evaluation of 
the country’s potential for foreign investors, remarking, “The investment climate is 
not ideal in Tajikistan. To date over four British companies have left Tajikistan. 
Problems with taxes, corruption and preparation of documents forced them [to do 
so].” (2)  Nonetheless, neither Rahmon’s administration nor the Tajik parliament 
has launched a drive for the swift and substantial reform of the state’s tax and 
financial systems, in order to bring more foreign dollars into the country. 
 
Without such reform, it may prove difficult to elicit more than pledges from foreign 
dignitaries and firms to help overhaul Tajikistan’s energy industry, unless 
Rahmon is able to offer a profit margin significant enough to dwarf all the other 
costs of doing business in his country.  A number of investors have signed on to 
smaller, less ambitious projects, but thus far no one has been willing to risk 
underwriting a venture the size of the Roghun facility.  Iranian Ambassador Ali-
Asghar She'rdust recently met with Rahmon in order to reassure him of Iran’s 
interest in working with the Tajik government on such projects as the construction 
of power lines, highways, and railroad lines from Tajikistan to Iran via 
Afghanistan, but a concrete timeline and division of fiscal responsibilities for 
these projects have yet to be drawn up. (3) Iran had seemed well-poised to take 
on the majority investor role in the financing and construction of the Roghun 
hydroelectric station; Iran is building the Sangtuda-2 hydropower station and has 
agreed to speed up construction in time for the facility to go on line one year 
ahead of schedule, in 2011. (4)  However, although the Iranian government has 
expressed some interest in possibly participating in the Roghun investment 
consortium, it has yet to actually sign on to the project. 
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The Tajik government’s apparent urgency in obtaining financial backing for the 
Roghun dam and hydropower station project is due to the fact that once 
completed, Roghun is slated to become the main supplier of power to the 
Tajikistan Aluminum Plant (TadAP).  TadAP is Tajikistan’s largest consumer of 
electricity and creating a new source of power just for the plant would lift a huge 
burden from the country’s other hydropower stations and make more electricity 
available for smaller businesses, as well as for residents.  Completing the 
Roghun dam and hydroelectric station therefore is a clear priority for President 
Rahmon’s government, one which seems inordinately difficult to achieve. (5) 
 
The Roghun project was started during the days of Soviet rule, but stalled after 
the USSR’s collapse, and negotiations to finish its construction did not begin until 
well after the end of Tajikistan’s civil war, in 2004.  The Roghun contract 
eventually was granted to a Russian company, RUSAL, but when President 
Rahmon and RUSAL executives did not see eye to eye on the project’s 
development, RUSAL’s contract was cancelled, and construction was once again 
halted.  Another Russian company, Unified Energy Systems (UES), expressed 
interest in taking on the Roghun project, (6) but the offer fell on deaf ears.  UES 
already is the principal underwriter for the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric power station 
but has experienced production delays and financial problems. (7) 
 
However, due to the project’s urgent nature and President Rahmon’s inability to 
find enough non-Russian financing, in late May Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov 
appealed to his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, inviting the Russian 
Federation to join an international consortium to complete Roghun’s construction. 
(8)  During his meeting with Rahmon in St. Petersburg on 7 June, Russian 
President Dmitri Medvedev seemed to offer the Tajik president a small window of 
hope when he lauded the Sangtuda-1 venture as an example of successful 
cooperation between the two countries and stated that “…Russia was interested 
in actively taking part in the implementation of other energy projects of Tajikistan 
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as well.” (9)  Kommersant reported on 6 June that Anatoli Chubais’ Inter RAO 
Unified Energy Systems is in talks with the Tajik government to take over the 
Roghun project, but that no deals had been reached yet. (10)  Finding mutually 
acceptable terms may prove to be a challenge for the two sides, given the Tajik 
government’s recent, problem-fraught history with Russian investments in its 
hydropower industry. 
 
On the other hand, the Tajik government seems to have no qualms about 
working with Russian oil and gas companies.  On 10 June, Tajik Energy and 
Industry Minister Sherali Gul and a deputy chairman of Gazprom, Valeri Golubev, 
signed an agreement permitting Gazprom to prospect for both oil and natural gas 
in Rengan, Sargazon, Sarykamysh and West Shaambaru.  Golubev estimated 
that just the gas deposits in these fields could yield up to 300 trillion cubic 
meters.  The cost of exploring these deposits is estimated at $500 million and will 
take four to five years to complete. If Golubev’s estimates are anywhere near 
correct, then Tajikistan might, at some point in the future, develop the capacity 
not only to meet domestic demand for natural gas but to export fuel, as well. (11)  
However, cold weather is a scant six to eight months away and even during the 
warm weather months, residences and businesses must have electricity and gas 
in order to function, but these resources, in some parts of the country, are in 
short supply year-round. 
 
Thus, Tajikistan’s economic woes seem destined to continue for at least another 
winter, as inflation continues to rise (for the first quarter of 2008, Tajikistan led 
the rest of the CIS with an inflation rate of 26.6%), (12) rates for drinking water 
and sewage systems double, (13) and food prices soar.  The UN World Food 
Programme (WFP) has granted $8 million in food aid to those with young 
children, the sick, and families who lost their homes in natural disasters, while the 
WFP’s annual budget for Tajikistan amounts to $26 million. However, this is little 
more than a small drop in what has become a yawning chasm of need – Zlatan 
Milisic, head of the UN WFP office in Tajikistan, estimates that one out of every 
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ten families in the country requires emergency food aid. (14)  This is a 
devastating statistic at a time of year when fresh fruit and vegetables tend to be 
plentiful in Central Asia, and livestock should be producing milk and eggs.  With 
harvest numbers already lower than expected, the next winter will be a hungry 
one for many; the UN has predicted that circumstances could become so dire 
that Tajikistan will face famine. 
 
The prices and scarcity of resources also may prove to be a political time bomb 
for President Rahmon, who has spent recent weeks promising to resolve the 
country’s energy woes and spare his citizens the suffering they endured this 
winter.  If he is not able to fulfill at least part of those promises, he may lose not 
only popular support, but also the backing of the country’s political elite.  Recent 
protests and small-scale armed conflicts in various parts of the country seem to 
indicate that some local factional leaders are becoming restless and sense that 
Rahmon’s government is weakening and may not be able to maintain order 
outside the capital for much longer.  The winter of 2008-2009 could prove to be 
the hardest test that Rahmon’s administration has faced since the civil war ended 
in 1997. 
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UKRAINE 
Fiddling while the “Revolution” burns 
As Ukraine faces inflation, a budget shortfall, increased violence against 
minorities, charges of increasing political repression, international criticism for a 
lack of preparation to host the Euro 2012 football championships, wage arrears 
and increasing tension with Russia over its NATO aspirations, the biggest 
questions heard in Kyiv today are, “When will the government fall?” and “Whose 
fault is it?” 
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These questions are not new. But today, they are asked more wearily than at any 
time since the country’s 2004 “orange revolution.”  Since that time, the country 
has endured a succession of political crises, as politicians appear more 
interested in battling each other than running the country. 
 
To be sure, the administration of President Viktor Yushchenko, who took office 
thanks to the 2004 protests, can point to clear accomplishments in the sphere of 
personal and political freedom. Two successive parliamentary elections were 
deemed free and fair, and held with Western European-level political competition. 
Media censorship and the use of the “power ministries” against political 
opponents also lessened considerably, following the protests (although these 
tactics did not disappear). 
 
Still, the country has failed to reform its major institutions, most of which continue 
to be run using Soviet-era systems (and in many cases, personnel). Ukraine also 
has shown an inconsistent commitment to rooting out the endemic corruption that 
plagues almost every sector of the economy. Furthermore, the country has 
endured a succession of four governments in less than four years, two national 
parliamentary elections in three years, and the splintering of the blocs that united 
in 2004 to support Yushchenko’s presidential bid.  Indeed, President 
Yushchenko, who was once known as a force for unity, has shown himself 
unable to create efficient working relationships with Ukraine’s governments. This 
inability has led to almost constant instability in the country’s leadership and 
frequent policy and legislative deadlock. 
 
Yushchenko dismissed his first prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, in 2005 after 
she accused his National Security and Defense Council secretary of corruption. 
The President then broke from the majority of his political bloc’s members to 
name former presidential election opponent Viktor Yanukovych as prime minister 
in August of 2006.  Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called new elections in 
2007, when Yanukovych threatened to impeach him. And the President has 
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spent all of 2008 severely criticizing the second government of Yulia 
Tymoshenko, going so far as to veto the majority of her government’s 
resolutions. 
 
Much of the criticism of Tymoshenko now comes officially from the office of 
Yushchenko’s Chief of Staff, Viktor Baloha. On 4 April, Baloha placed a rambling, 
often incoherent statement attacking the Prime Minister on Yushchenko’s official 
website. Baloha—who is called the “gray cardinal” in Ukraine’s media—called 
Tymoshenko a “mercenary” who is conducting “shady deals” with “secret 
agreements” allowing massive theft of state funds. (1) 
 
The statement triggered a severe response from Tymoshenko’s allies. In an 
official statement, the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) accused the president 
and his allies of “anti-Ukrainian measures,” including “total ruination of all 
initiatives of the democratic government,” “blocking all anti-corruption initiatives of 
the government,” “creation of panic and hysteria regarding inflation,” “halting of 
civilized privatization,” “taking into their hands shadow schemes in the gas 
sphere,” “providing cover for the corrupt leadership of the State Property Fund, 
… and disgracing the Ukrainian state.” (2) 
 
Most recently, Yushchenko expressed his disappointment with the work of the 
government in an interview with Spanish newspaper ABC. “I will use all my 
influence to modify the current course,” he said. “However, it will be necessary to 
hold elections if there is no other choice.” (3) 
 
The comment is likely a bluff, unless Yushchenko has decided not to run for re-
election in late 2009/early 2010.  In recent special elections (yes, another special 
election) for the Kyiv Mayor and City Council/Assembly, voter turnout hovered 
around a dismal 50 percent, and Yushchenko saw his political bloc booted out of 
the council as it polled slightly over two percent, failing to pass the three percent 
vote threshold.  (4) 
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The result for Tymoshenko also no doubt was disappointing to the prime 
minister, who had pushed for the special election in an attempt to install a closer 
ally in the mayoral seat, and to solidify her bloc’s position as the majority in the 
council. Tymoshenko’s bloc saw its percentage of voter support decrease 19 
percent, leaving her with slightly more than 22 percent of the vote. The bloc is 
now in second place behind the bloc of Mayor Leonid Chernovetsky, who not 
only stymied Tymoshenko’s plans by winning re-election, but also won about 30 
percent of the Kyiv council seats. (5) 
 
Following this setback, and sensing growing public dissatisfaction with the 
constant political bickering of the country’s leadership, Tymoshenko once again 
began reaching out to the president and calling for unity.  She attempted to 
reassure Western allies that she continues to support a coalition with the 
president and that she is in control of the parliament. "Ukraine has very good 
potential and is developing positively, and what we need to get is political unity 
between the president ... and my majority in the parliament,” she told EU foreign 
policy chief Javier Solana in Brussels on 19 June.  “From my side as head of the 
government, I will do my best to head in this direction," Tymoshenko added. (6) 
 
However, despite Tymoshenko’s assurances, her coalition has proven to be 
unworkable. The already razor-thin majority (227 of 450) was undercut on 6 June 
when parliamentary majority members Ihor Rybakov (BYuT) and Yuri But (Our 
Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense) announced that they will no longer vote with the 
coalition. (7) Rybakov and But have been called “frequent visitors” to the 
president by Ukraine’s media and are expected to join a new party being created 
by Baloha to support Yushchenko. The majority of the members in the 
President’s current parliamentary bloc (those who stood with him during the 
“orange revolution”) regularly disagree with Baloha and are viewed now as more 
loyal to the prime minister than to the president. 
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Despite her reassurances to Solana, Tymoshenko clearly recognizes her plight. 
Even as she met with EU officials in Brussels, her bloc took action. On 19 June, 
BYuT members blocked the Rada rostrum, threatening that they were prepared 
to stall the work of the parliament for 30 days, which could provide grounds for 
the dismissal of parliament. (8) Since the president would need to dismiss the 
body, it is unlikely that this would occur. 
 
However, the bloc once again is seizing upon old campaign slogans – 
demanding that parliamentary immunity from prosecution and deputy privileges 
be removed. BYuT has attempted to pass such bills on several occasions—most 
recently in the last two weeks—but failed. These parliamentary demonstrations of 
protest by BYuT members in the past have worked well to increase the bloc’s 
support and undermine the president. The action also helps to disguise the fact 
that the “majority” is unlikely to be able to pass any legislation, given its fractured 
state. BYuT also can escape some public wrath for the action, given that Viktor 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions had announced plans to boycott the legislative 
sessions (hoping no doubt to spotlight the coalition’s disunity). (9) 
 
Tymoshenko also announced that her government would pursue prosecutions 
against members of Yanukovych’s former government for “misuse of budget 
funds.” The country, she said, “has never seen such large-scale financial abuse 
before. … Evidence from the Main Control and Revision Office shows that 10.2 
billion hryvnias [approximately $2 billion] were stolen.” (10) Yanukovych’s allies 
immediately threatened to sue Tymoshenko for slander. (11) 
 
With this action, Tymoshenko moves herself more firmly back to the position of 
“anti-corruption crusader” – a position that has made her Ukraine’s most popular 
Western-oriented politician. Echoing her statements during the “orange 
revolution,” she said, “My goal is for everyone guilty of misusing the 10.2 billion 
hryvnia to be held responsible. The fact that officials from the previous 
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government and previous ten years were never punished gives the sense that 
the country can be robbed with impunity.” (12) 
 
Yushchenko so far has not responded to Tymoshenko’s latest volley. What is 
clear, however, is that very little legislating will be done in Ukraine in the short to 
medium-term future. Sensing that, Russian leaders have increased their 
pressure on their neighbor, threatening a significant increase in the price Ukraine 
pays for Russian and Central Asian gas, rejecting calls to prepare to remove the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet from Crimea, and suggesting that the country may 
question whether Crimea belongs to Ukraine at all. Ukraine so far has provided 
only a limited response to any of these issues, as its politicians battle each other 
for control. 
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